Exclusive dealing, common agency, and multiprincipals incentive theory...this way instead of taking a common retailer? This article traces back the benefits of this organizational form of distribution to the provision of incentives in a setting of competing manufacturer-retailer hierarchies under adverse selection....
"when should manufacturers want fair trade?": new insights from asymmetric informationWe study a specific model of competing manufacturer-retailer pairs where adverse selection and moral hazard are coupled with non-market externalities at the downstream level....
“when should manufacturers want fair trade?”: new insights from asymmetric information ∗We study a specific model of competing manufacturer-retailer pairs where adverse selection and moral hazard are coupled with non-market externalities at the downstream level....
Working paper no. 218 "when should manufacturers want fair trade?": new insights from asymmetric information and non-market externalities when supply chains competeWe study a specific model of competing manufacturer-retailer pairs where adverse selection and moral hazard are coupled with non-market externalities at the downstream level....
