Thus, a diversion from current trade flows is likely to happen.

These simulations allow calculating the actual level of the out-of-quota tariff capable of deterring trade diversion.

As explained, this above quota tariff level does not grant full protection shielding the Union completely against trade diversion.

This progressive decrease is already causing and will further generate trade diversion that is liable to speed up the increase trend of imports into the Union.

The Commission did not consider that the risk of trade diversion stemming from the U.S. Section 232 measures had been reduced or even disappeared as a result of the recent developments.

For the non-cooperating exporting producers, a significant threat of trade diversion can be found when comparing the domestic demand and the significant volumes of PET that are sold to third countries.

On this basis, it is considered that the allocated quotas give no guarantee that the allocated quota would be sufficient to prevent trade diversion.

The EU has also initiated measures to prevent undesired effects such as trade diversion and the resulting influx of low-priced steel and aluminum imports onto the European market.

This updated set of data allowed the Commission to confirm the findings made at provisional stage, in particular with regard to the import trends and the risk of trade diversion.

This analysis indicates that the lower end of the off-quota tariff level capable of ensuring a minimal protection of the Union against the trade diversion should at least be 25 %.

The issue at stake, however, is the unprecedented and increased number of such measures taken by third countries, which have created trade diversion resulting in increase of imports into the EU.

In this context, the established risk of trade diversion would be a key element that would negatively affect the current economic situation of the Union industry if measures are not adopted.